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This paper presents an analysis of New Zealand's law relating to 
hazardous substances. The analysis follows the method out!ined in the 
,~ 
Cen tre for Resource Management's publication "Property"" Rights and 
Natural Resource Policy". The existing law is described and a reasoned 
reform offered. 
Existing institutional arrangement 
The hazards associated with technical processes and their products are 
part and parcel of modern life; they cannot be outlawed. Nor can law 
prevent their occasional realisation; at the very least, accidents will 
always occur. The law can be expected, however, to limit the hazard 
and to restrict the cost of accidents, and to do so, moreover, without 
unnecessary constraint on technical innovation. It would be poor 
policy indeed to control hazardous substances simply by restricting 
technical progress. 
Legislation to limit hazards has been continually introduced in New 
Zealand and amended in response both to new technologies and to 
increasing concerns for public safety. The law has thus evolved in 
piecemeal fashion, without overall design, and has embodied accumulated 
experience and understanding. Owing to its history, and the 
pervasiveness of hazardous substances, the resultant law is dispersed 
amongst many statutes administered by a variety of agencies. It 
provides rules appropriate to different substances (e.g. explosives & 
radioactive materials) and different activities (e.g. transportation & 
manufacture), and provides for control by specialists (e.g. Pesticides 
Board & Factory Inspectors) with expertise in specific products (e.g. 
pesticides) and specific activities (e.g. manufacture).l 
As it stands, the law provides considerable scope for comprehensive 
control of hazardous substances. This control is effected through 
statutory regulation, statutory provision for further regulation, and 
statutory requirement that licenses and consents (i.e. entitlements) be 
obtained before undertaking certain hazardous acti vi ties. These 
entitlements are variously granted by Ministers of the Crown (e.g. use 
1 More detail of existing law is appended, as is a review of the 
economic literature on liability. 
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and administration of radioactive materials). statutory boards (e.g. 
use of pesticides)~ civil servants (e.g. manufacture of explosives), 
and local a.thorities (e.g. storage of dangerous goods). 
Rights of civil action with respect to hazardous substances are. 
however. limited. Under the Accident Compensation Act 1982 a person 
suffering personal injury by accident has no civil right of action 
against the injurer; the injurer is not liable for damages. Moreover, 
statutory authorisation of hazardous acti vi ties has circumscribed 
strict liability for property damage; licensees undertaking hazardous 
activities are liable for property damage only if judged negligent. 
Enterprises undertaking hazardous activities and dealing with hazardous 
substances are, therefore, directly liable only for property damage and 
then only if negligent. They thus carry the cost of the hazards to 
which they expose people only so far as their ACC levies reflect that 
hazard, and criminal sanctions must be relied upon to ensure adequate 
precautions against personal injury; there is no threat of civil action 
following injury caused through unsafe practice. 
Proposed reform 
The proposed reform to hazardous substance policy is to return the 
right of civil action with respect to personal injury. This would 
enable those suffering personal injury as a consequence of the 
negligence of others to claim recompense. This recompense would serve 
as an inducement for those injured to take action and, in turn, for 
those engaged in hazardous activities and dealing with hazardous 
substances to take reasonable care. Returning the right of civil 
action for personal injury would thus provide a complement to existing 
law limiting the hazard to which people are exposed. 
The abrogation of the right of civil action with respect to personal 
injury is, however, a central plank of the Accident Compensation Act 
1982, and it could only be returned through major reform of present 
policy of compensation for incapacity. Problems with present policy of 
compensation may themselves prompt such reform. In particular, if 
there is a community responsibility to provide for those who are 
incapacitated, that responsibility should be placed with all taxpayers. 
And, if the aim is to provide comprehensive entitlement, that cover 
should extend to include all incapacity, whether it be the result of 
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accident or of illness. The logical policy for community provision of 
comprehensive cover for incapacity is a taxpayer-funded minimum wage. 
Whether the community as a whole should be so generous as those upon 
whom the responsibility now falls is a moot point. 
In analysing policies for hazardous substances and accident 
compensation it is necessary to distinguish compensation from 
deterrence. The reason for enabling those who suffer loss through the 
negligence of others to make a claim over and above a minimum level of 
support is not that they are more deserving than those who are 
incapacitated in other ways, nor that such claims provide a means of 
obtaining realistic compensation; rather, payment to victims of 
negligent acts or omissions is the price of enlisting their 
participation (and the participation of their lawyers) in a social 
mechanism serving to limit the hazards to which people and their 
property are exposed. Much confusion, and poor policy, have resulted 
from a failure to make this distinction. 
Benefit of reform 
The return of the right of civil action with respect to personal injury 
is conjectured to offer a number of advantages. The social cost of 
damages arising from negligent acts or omissions would rest with those 
responsible. The cost would be internalised. A pervasive influence to 
complement existing law would have been added. It would no longer be 
vital to regulate every potentially hazardous substance or activity as 
liability for damages resulting from negligent acts or omissions would 
serve to limit otherwise unregulated hazards. And the inducement to 
take reasonable care need not be diminished by liability insurance: 
premiums will in all probability reflect the insured's history, and 
those who are negligent are likely to have their premiums increased. 
Liability for negligence would mean safety measures reduce production 
costs, rather than add to them. Production costs would be kept low by 
limiting the possibility of suit for damages. This would require 
undertaking all precautions justifiable in a court of law on the basis 
of their cost and efficacy, even those not required by existing 
regulation. Those responsible for hazards would thus be encouraged to 
have regard to. safety measures generally, and decisions upon the level 
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of precaution necessary would extend to include the judicature as well 
as regulatory authorities. 
Furthermore. the public would no longer rely solely upon regulatory 
agencies to protect their interests. They would be able to participate 
directly in the decision-making process through the courts and this in 
turn would encourage enhanced perception of the hazards concomitant 
with modern life, and hence greater assurance for the public that their 
interests were being protected. 
Indicator of failure 
The benefits of reform described above are conjectural; the reform may 
not work as expected. The right of civil action may fail to limit the 
hazard to which people and their property are exposed. 
The success or otherwise of the reform could not, however, be assessed 
by the incidence of civil actions; even if no actions were brought the 
reform may nevertheless have a dramatic effect. The assessment would 
have to be based on the influence that the reform had on hazardous 
activities, that is, whether as a result more care was taken than at 
present. What would indicate that the reforms had failed would be no 
improvement in the behaviour of people undertaking hazardous activities 
and dealing with hazardous substances. 
If the reform, for whatever reason, did not succeed, little would be 
lost. The existing statutory regulations for hazardous substances, and 
the existing level of protection, would remain, and the rationalisation 
of policy for incapacity may itself justify the associated reform. 
Indeed, the return of the right of civil action would best be made in 
concert with wider reform of social welfare legislation. 
Subsequent reform 
If, on the other hand, the reform proved successful it could be 
followed by the removal of superfluous regulations, in particular, 
those designed to guard against negligent acts or omissions. The focus 
for regulation could thus be directed upon those hazards for which 
actions for damages are unlikely to be successful and which are 
unlikely to be adequately controlled by the threat of civil action. 
For example, those hazards that are widely dispersed amongst the 
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community, those which may not be manifest for a long time, or those 
for which it is difficult to demonstrate causality. Regulations thus 
complement liability rules. Their rationalisation, however, would 
reduce the complexity of existing law and the cost of its enforcement. 
Licensing and consent procedures could be similar,ly rationalised by 
'm~ 
being limited to those activities and substances which even when 
undertaken and used in a reasonable manner may prove unacceptable 
hazards. Rationalised licensing and consent procedures would provide a 
more certain commercial environment. 
In light of experience, it might also be deemed desirable to adjust 
liability rules by statute. For example, it might be desirable to make 
ultra-hazardous activities strictly liable or to provide statutory 
guidelines on the adjudication of negligence and the award of damages. 
Conclusions 
The preceding analysis recommends liability for personal injury as a 
complement to regulation in hazardous substances policy. It sug~ests 
that increased protection need not involve increased regulation and, on 
the contrary, may involve a reassessment of the desired extent of 
regulation. An important decision in any reform of hazardous 
substances policy, therefore t is whether liability rules are to 
complement regulation and entitlement procedures. The analysis also 
demonstrates the interrelationship between hazardous substances policy 
and policy of compensating for incapacity. 
Underpinning the analysis is the proposition that liability for 
negligent acts or omissions serves as an inducement to take reasonable 
care. This proposition is but a conjecture and might well be rebutted. 
However, its truth or otherwise can be assessed only by a critical 
examination of that data by which it can be refuted or affirmed; the 
extent to which the proposition is believed to be true or false is a 
poor guide to its validity. 
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Appendix one: Statutes cited 
Accident Compensation Act 1982 
Agricultural Workers Act 1977 
Animal Remedies Act 1967 
Bush Workers Act 1945 
Carriage by Air Act 1967 
Carriage of Goods Act 1979 
Civil Aviation Act 1964 
Civil Defence Act 1983 
Clean Air Act 1972 
Coal Mines Act 1979 
Construction Act 1959 
Contributory Negligence Act 1947 
Crimes Act 1961 
Customs Act 1966 
Dangerous Goods Act 1974 
Explosives Act 1957 
Factories and Commerci.al Premises Act 1981 
Fair Trading Act 1986 
Fire Service Act 1975 
Food Act 1981 
Gas Act 1982 
Health Act 1956 
Local Government Act 1974 
Marine Pollution Act 1974 
Medicines Act 1981 
Mining Act 1971 
New Zealand Railways Corporation Act 1981 
Occupiers' Liability Act 1962 
Pesticides Act 1979 
Petroleum Act 1937 
Petroleum Regulations 1978 
Quarries and Tunnels Act 1982 
Radiation Protection Act 1965 
Sale of Goods Act 1908 
Shipping and Seamen Act 1952 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
Town and Country Planning Act 1977 
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Toxic Substances Act 1979 
Transport Act 1962 
Water and Soil Act 1967 
Appendix two: Limiting the hazard 
The hazard to which people and their property are exposed is limited by 
the existing law in three ways: 
1. Restricting who may use hazardous substances. i. e. by 
licensing and consent procedures; 
2. Restricting what use may be made of hazardous substances, 
i.e. by regulation; and by, 
3. Establishing penalties for those who expose people or their 
property to hazard, i.e. by liability rules. 
Some of the detail of each of these mechanisms is reviewed in turn. 
Licensing and consent procedures 
There are five statutes each designed to deal with a specific class of 
hazardous substance: the Explosives Act 1957, the Radiation Protection 
Act 1965, the Dangerous Goods Act 1974, the Toxic Substances Act 1979, 
and the Pesticides Act 1979. Each Act defines and classifies a class 
of hazardous substance, 2 establishes a combined regulatory and 
licensing system for its control,3 provides for inspectors,4 gives them 
power to enforce the regulatory and licensing structure,S and details 
sanctions. 6 
Manufacture of explosives requires application for a licence to the 
Chief Inspector of Explosives within the Department of Labour.7 The 
Chief Inspector may grant an application, grant it subject to such 
modifications of the proposals as he thinks fit, having regard to 
2 The definition of each class of hazardous substance is detailed in 
Appendix Five. 
3 Specific references to the statutes establishing this regulatory 
and licensing system follow in this and the following subsection. 
4 Explosives Act 1957 sSG 6-8; Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 
24(1); Dangerous Goods Act 1974 sSG 5-8; Toxic Substances Act 1979 
sSG 9-10; Pesticides Act 1979 SSe 9-11. 
5 Explosives Act 1957 s. 9; Radiation Protection Act 1965 SSe 24-25; 
Dangerous Goods Act 1974 sSG 19-25; Toxic Substances Act 1979 sSG 
47-60; Pesticides Act 1979 sSG 55-62. 
6 Explosives Act 1957 sSG 38(3),46(3),51(4),54,56,57,62(2); Radiation 
Protection Act 1965 SSe 20,26,29; Dangerous Goods Act 1974 sSG 
35(0), 39-40; Toxic Substances Act 1979 SSe 26(5),31(5), 36(5),46, 
55(6) ,60,62,64,66,82(1) (t); Pesticides Act 1979 ss. 30( 2),31 (4) , 
32(4),40(5),41(4),53(1)(m),67-69,76(1)(0). 
7 Explosives Act 1957 sSG 6,16. 
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public safety or the safety of any particular persons or of adjacent 
buildings, or refuse the application if he thinks the interests of 
public safety so require. 8 A licence is also required to sell 
explosives and to carry certain explosives,9 and except in certain 
circumstances, explosives can be stored only in a factory licensed to 
manufacture explosives, a storage place specified in a licence to sell 
explosives, a public magazine appointed by the Minister of Labour, or a 
private magazine licensed by the Chief Inspector. IO 
Use and administration of radioactive materials requires a licence from 
the Director-General of Health: 11 and an application may, as the 
Director-General sees fit, be granted, granted with conditions 
attached, or refused. 12 
Storage of dangerous goods requires a licence from the local authority 
declared to be a local licensing authority by the Minister of Labour. 13 
Upon receiving an application, the authority may grant a licence, grant 
it subject to such modifications of the proposal as it thinks fit, 
having regard to public safety or the safety of any person or the 
protection of any property, or, if it thinks the interests of public 
safety so require, refuse to grant a licence. 14 
Any toxic substance may be declared to be a deadly poison, a dangerous 
poison, a standard poison, or a harmful substance by the Governor-
General, upon the advice of the Minister of Health and the Toxic 
Substances Board (comprising members nominated by specified ministers 
and interest groupsl5) .16 To pack and sell deadly ~ dangerous and 
standard poisons requires a licence from the District Medical Officer 
of Health; 17 a licence is granted if the applicant fulfills the 
8 Ibid. s. 18. 
9 Ibid. sSG 23,40. 
10 Ibid. sSG 26,30,31. 
11 Radiation Protection Act 1965 SSe 13,16. 
12 Ibid. sSG 16,17. 
13 Dangerous Goods Act 1974 sSG 7,9. 
14 Ibid. s. 9. 
15 Toxic Substances Act 1979 SSe 11-18. 
16 Ibid. s. 7. 
17 Ibid. sSG 20,67. 
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specified requirements and is considered a fit and proper person with 
suitable premises. 18 
Pesticides may be declared controlled by the Governor-General on the 
advice of the Minister and the Pesticides Board (comprising members 
nominated by specified ministers and interest groupsI9), or directly by 
the Minister on the recommendation of the Board;20 a licence from the 
Board is required to use controlled pesticides. 21 
In each of the above cases, applicants have rights of appeal to the 
judicature,22 the exception being licenses to use and administer 
radioactive materials, where any person may appeal, and for which the 
Minister of Health constitutes a special Board. 23 
Further consents are additional to these licence requirements. Only 
explosives authorised by the Governor-General may be manufactured or 
imported,24 and each consignment requires an entry permit from an 
inspector of explosives. 25 To import, manufacture, sell, store, and 
transport radioactive materials, requires the Minister of Health's 
consent,26 the Minister being advised by the Radiation Protection 
Advisory Authority - a panel of experts. 27 Only pesticides registered 
by the Pesticides Board may be sold,28 and an application to register a 
pesticide may be refused on the grounds that it, or the circumstances 
of its use, are likely to harm human beings, agricultural produce, or 
the environment. 29 The Board may, having regard to the relative 
toxicity of the pesticide, its environmental effects, and such other 
matters as the Board thinks fit, restrict the use of a registered 
pesticide, and it has the power to revoke registration. 30 
18 Ibid. 1979 s. 36. 
19 Pesticides Act 1979 s. 12. 
20 Ibid .. s. 43. 
21 Ibid. sSG 12-13,44. 
22 Explosives Act 1957 s. 55; Dangerous Goods Act 1974 s. 14; Toxic 
Substances Act 1979 s. 67; Pesticides Act 1979 s. 70. 
23 Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 23. 
24 Explosives Act 1957 s. 11. 
25 Ibid. s. 12. 
26 Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 12. 
27 Ibid. SSe 5-11. 
28 Pesticides Act 1979 s. 21. 
29 Ibid. s. 27. 
30 Ibid. SSe 28,29. 
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As well as the above Acts dealing with a specific class of hazardous 
substance, the Animal Remedies Act 1967 and the Medicines Act 1981 
establish licensing arrangements for certain potentially hazardous 
products. The Animal Remedies Board, nominated by a variety of 
interests,31 for example, can deny a licence to import or manufacture 
an animal remedy on the grounds that it represents a danger to animal 
or public health. 32 The Minister of Health's consent is required to 
sell or supply a new medicine, a consent which may be refused if he 
considers that the risk of the medicine injuriously affecting the 
health of any person outweighs its likely therapeutic value,33 and the 
Minister may revoke or suspend his consent if a medicine is considered 
unsafe, ineffective, or in any way unsatisfactory.34 To manufacture, 
pack, and wholesale medicines requires a licence,35 and importers or 
manufacturers may be required by the Director-General of Health to 
satisfy his concerns over the safety of their products, his concerns 
may be referred to an appropriate committee, and the Minister may 
prohibit or impose conditions upon the importation and manufacture of 
medicines. 36 
As appropriate to the purposes and objectives of district planning, 
District Schemes are required to have regard to the avoidance or 
reduction of danger, damage, or nuisance caused by the storage, 
transport, and disposal of hazardous substances. 37 Control is effected 
through District Schemes zoning land for different classes of use and 
development, and specifying uses requiring planning consent,38 such 
consents are able to be granted, granted with attached conditions, or 
refused,39 with appeal rights to the Planning Tribunal. 40 
Licensing requirements also exist under Acts designed to deal with 
pollution. Specified air-polluting processes require a license;41 the 
31 Animal Remedies Act 1967 s. 5. 
32 Ibid. SSe 18,21. 
33 Medicines Act 1981 s. 22. 
34 Ibid. s. 35. 
35 Ibid. s. 17. 
36 Ibid. s. 36. 
37 Town and Country Planning Act 1977 S. 36(1), Second Schedule. 
38 Ibid. s. 36(4). 
39 Ibid. s. 67. 
40 Ibid. s. 69. 
41 Clean Air Act 1972 SSe 23-41. 
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discharge of waste into natural water requires a water right;42 and a 
permit is required from the Minister of Transport to discharge or 
incinerate wastes at sea. 43 
RegulatioIl; 
As well as the licensing and consent arrangements described above, the 
five Acts designed to deal with a specific class of hazardous substance 
use statutory regulation. and statutory provisions for additional 
regulation, to limit the hazard. Statutory regulations apply to the 
storage of both poisons and harmful substances,44 to the packaging of 
explosives, dangerous goods. poisons and harmful substances, and 
pesticides,45 and to the disposal of explosives. 46 As well, the 
Governor-General has powers under each Act to make regulations by Order 
in Council for a number of specific purposes,47 and for quite general 
purposes. 48 
In addition, the Minister of Health may, on the recommendation of the 
Toxic Substances Board, prohibit the importation or manufacture of any 
toxic substance. 49 
There are also statutory regulations relating to the general safety of 
medicines, animal remedies, and food, and in each case, provision 
exists for the Governor-General by Order in Council to make further 
regulations. 50 
Local authorities have delegated powers to make bylaws with respect to 
conserving public health, well-being, safety, and convenience. 51 
42 Water and Soil Act 1967 s. 21. 
43 Marine Pollution Act 1974 s. 22. 
44 Toxic Substances Act 1979 s. 29. 
45 Explosives Act 1957 s. 43; Dangerous Goods Act 1974 s. 28; Toxic 
Substances Act 1979 SSe 26,30; Pesticides Act 1979 s. 38. 
46 Explosives Act 1957 SSe 48,49. 
47 Explosives Act 1957 s. 62; Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 31; 
Dangerous Goods Act 1974 s. 35; Toxic Substances Act 1979 s. 82; 
Pesticides Act 1979 SSe 53,76. 
48 Explosives Act 1957 s. 62(2)(p); Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 
31(v); Dangerous Goods Act 1974 s. 35(p): Toxic Substances Act 1979 
s. 82(u); Pesticides Act 1979 SSe 53(n),76(p). 
49 Toxic Substances Act 1979 SSe 29,33. 
50 Medicines Act 1981; Animal Remedies Act 1967; Food Act 1981. 
51 Local Government Act 1974 s. 684(8). 
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There are also statutes concerned with particular activities. Under 
the Customs Act 1966, for example, certain goods may be declared 
prohibited imports. 52 Further, the Governor-General may by Order in 
Council prohibit importations of any goods where necessary in the 
public interest, for the prevention of communicable diseases, or where 
the sale of such goods would be against the law. 53 Conditional 
prohibition may allow the importation of goods under the authority of a 
licence or permit and subject to any prescribed conditions. 54 
Inspectors of factories have the power to deal immediately with serious 
dangers and can serve notice on the occupier of a factory to take 
forthwith such steps as required, including the cessation of any 
specified process or activity or to restrict operations until specified 
goods or substances have been removed and stored in a specified 
manner. 55 
Statutory regulations apply to the carriage of goods in ships56 and 
specified dangerous goods must be stowed, packaged, marked, labelled 
and documented in accordance to the requirements and standards in the 
Code published by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consul tati ve 
Organisation. 57 In addition, dangerous goods are not to be sent by 
ship unless clearly marked and written notice given to the master or 
owner of ship before goods are taken on board. 58 With respect to civil 
aviation, the Governor-General by Order in Council may make regulations 
for carrying out the Convention on International Civil Aviation,59 and 
may make regulations for adoption of recommended practices and 
procedures and generally regulate civil aviation. 60 The carriage of 
dangerous goods by civil aircraft must accord with lATA Restricted 
52 Customs Act 1966 s. 48(1). 
53 Ibid. s. 48(3). 
54 Ibid. s. 48(5). 
55 Factories and Commercial Premises Act 1981 s. 19. 
56 Shipping and Seamen Act 1952 s. 307(1). 
57 Ibid. s. 307(lA); Shipping (Dangerous Goods) Rules 1979. 
58 Ibid. s. 303. 
59 Civil Aviation Act 1964 s. 29(1). 
60 Ibid. 29(1)(a,b). 
13 
Articles Regulations. 61 A Standard Code of Practice sets out 
requirements for the safe transport of hazardous substances on 1and. 62 
" Substances declared hazardous by the Railways Corporation, or its Act, 
may not be brought upon a Corporation service without marking the 
nature of the contents and providing written notice, and the 
Corporation may refuse to accept any hazardous substance or dangerous 
good. 63 The Governor-General by Order in Council may make regulations 
declaring certain goods to be dangerous and regulating or prohibiting 
the transport of such goods on any Corporation service. 64 
The Governor-General also has wide powers to make regulations 
prescribing, for the safety of the public or of any person, matters in 
relation to the design and construction of motor vehicles or any 
specified classes of motor vehicles, and generally regulating the use 
of vehicles. 65 
The Governor-General by Order in Council can prescribe a product safety 
standard for the purpose of preventing or reducing the risk of injury 
to any person. Such standards relate to the goods themselves. to the 
testing of goods during or after manufacturing or processing, or to the 
form and content of markings, warnings or instructions to accompany the 
goods. 66 Action by the Minister may also result in goods being 
declared unsafe or recalled. 67 
Several Acts regulate the use of exp10sives,68 and the Mining Act 1971 
provides for the regulation of cyanide and concentrating plants in or 
about mines,69 the Petroleum Act 1937- for the storage, transportation 
and use of petroleum and petroleum products produced in New Zea1and,70 
61 Civil Aviation Regulations 1953 31(1,2); Civil Aviation Safety 
Order No. 13. 
62 Standards Association of New Zealand NZS:5433:1983. 
63 New Zealand Railways Corporation Act 1981 s. 18(1). 
64 Ibid. s. 110(1). 
65 Transport Act 1962 s. 77(1)(ee,w). 
66 Fair Trading Act 1986 s. 29(1). 
67 Ibid. SSe 31,32. 
68 Petroleum Regulations 1978 s. 23; Construction Act 1959 s. 16; Coal 
Mines Act 1979 s. 265(11); Quarries and Tunnels Act 1982 s 43(e); 
Mining Act 1971 s. 232(11). 
69 Mining Act 1971 s. 232(10). 
70 Petroleum Act 1937 s. 47(m)(12). 
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the Petroleum Regulations 1978 for the use of radioactive materials,71 
and the Gas Act 1982 for all gas pipes, appliances and installations. 72 
The Clean Air Act 1972 provides for the making of clean air zones 
within which the use of certain fuels and fuel-burning equipment may be 
prohibited,73 provides for the promulgation of regulations governing 
design and performance standards for such things as motor cars,74 and 
enables the Governor-General by Order in Council to make regulations 
for a wide range of purposes. 75 
Liability rules 
Liability rules are another important feature of the existing 
institutional arrangement. 76 Those who transgress the law establishing 
licensing and regulatory structures for hazardous substances are 
criminally liable and punishable by the state. And those who harm 
others, even though they may not have broken this law, can be liable 
for damages if they have committed a tort. A tort was defined by the 
eminent New Zealand jurist Sir John Salmond as: 
[A] civil wrong for which the remedy is common law action for 
unliquidated damages, and which is not exclusively the breach of a 
contract or the breach of a trust or other merely equitable 
obligation.... In general, a tort consists in some act done by the 
defendant whereby he has without just cause or excuse caused some 
form of harm to the plaintiff. The law of tort exists for the 
purpose of preventing men from hurting one another, whether in 
respect of their property, their persons, their reputations, or 
anything else which is theirs. The fundamental principle of the 
branch of law is ••• to hurt nobody by word or deed. An action of 
tort, therefore, is usually a claim for pecuniary compensation in 
respect of damage so suffered ••• 77 
71 Petroleum Regulations 1978 s. 66. 
72 Gas Act 1982 s. 61. 
73 Clean Air Act 1972 SSe 12-18. 
74 Ibid. s. 19(5). 
75 Ibid. s. 55. 
76 For the relationship of liability rules and property rights 
generally, see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089 (1972); for the relationship with respect to natural 
resource policy in particular, see Bromley, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Environmental Economics 12 J.E.I. 43 (1978); 
and for the position of liability with respect to jurisprudence, 
see P.J. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE (12th ed. 1966). 
77 HEUSTON, SALMOND ON TORTS 13 (17th ed. 1977). 
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The specific torts relevant to hazardous substances are nuisance, 
negligence, breach of statutory duty, and the rule enunciated in 
Rylands v. Fletcher (i.e. strict liability).78 The tort of nuisance is 
divided into public nuisance and private nuisance. A public nuisance 
occurs when a person performs some act which constitutes a source of 
annoyance to the public at large, for example, allows rubbish or filth 
to be deposited on his land so as to be injurious to the inhabitants of 
the neighbourhood. The proper remedy is either criminal proceedings or 
an information by the Attorney-General on the part of the public, 
asking for an injunction to restrain the continuance of the public 
nuisance. It is only when there is some special injury to an 
individual that it is an action for damages. A private nuisance, on 
the other hand, is an act which interferes with a person's enjoyment of 
his land or property. Liability for nuisance is independent of 
negligence, that is to say, it is no defence that reasonable care was 
taken to prevent the act complained of being a nuisance. In judging 
what constitutes a nuisance: 
A balance has to be maintained between the right of the occupier to 
do what he likes with his own and the right of his neighbour not to 
be interfered with. It is impossible to give any precise or 
universal formula, but it may broadly be said that a useful test is 
wha tis reasonable according to the ordinary usages of mankind 
living in society or more correctly in a particular society.79 
Economists are less timid. In deciding whether A should be allowed to 
harm B, or whether B should be able to harm A, they seek to avoid the 
most serious harm. The solution depends essentially upon which party 
most values the right to harm the other. 80 
Negligence, in contrast to nuisance, is the omission to do something 
which a prudent and reasonable man would do, or the doing of something 
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, and is actionable 
78 More detail is contained in A.G. DAVIS, THE LAW OF TORTS IN NEW 
ZEALAND (2d ed. 1959), and JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS (6th 
ed. 1983); for the origins of torts, see J.H. BAKER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 336-390 (2d ed. 1979); 
Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEG. 
STUD. 403 (1974); Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A 
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort 
Law, 461 J. LEG. STUD. 461. 
79 sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callaghan [1940] A.C. 880, 903; [1940] 3 All 
E.R. 349, 364. 
80 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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whenever, as between plaintiff and the defendant, there is a duty cast 
upon the latter not to be negligent, and a breach of this duty which 
causes damage to the plaintiff. 81 Before the plaintiff can succeed in 
an action in negligence, he must establish that the damage was caused 
by some act or omission of the defendant, that the act or om~ssion was 
one of which a reasonable man behaving with ordinary prudence would not 
have been guilty, and that, in the circumstances of the case, the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, of which that act or 
omission was a breach. 82 The legal concept of the duty of care is that 
a defendant owes a duty of care to those persons whom he could 
reasonably have foreseen would be injured by his actions. 83 A 
manufacturer, for example, aware that the absence of reasonable care in 
the manufacture of his product will result in injury to the user's or 
consumer I s person or property. owes a duty to the user to take that 
reasonable care. 84 
Negligence is judged by the standard of prudence of an ordinary 
reasonable man,85 and if a person does something which one of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence would not do or omits some precaution which 
one of ordinary intelligence and prudence would take, he is negligent. 
At common law, a plaintiff partly at fault could recover no damages at 
all, but the Contributory Negligence Act 1947 enables the Court to 
award suitably reduced damages. Whether the act or omission in 
question is one which a reasonable man would recognise as posing an 
unreasonable risk is determined by balancing the magnitude of the risk, 
in the light of the likelihood of an accident happening and the 
possible seriousness of its consequences. against the difficul ty. 
expense, or any other disadvantage of desisting from the venture or 
taking a particular precaution. 86 
81 Davis, supra note 78, at 117. 
82 Ibid. at 117-118. 
83 ~ghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
84 Donoghue case, supra; Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd. 
[1936] A.C. 85. 
85 Vaughan v. Menlove 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 475. 
86 Fleming, supra note 78, at 109; Morris v. Hartlepool Nav. Co. 
[1956] A.C. 552, 574. The implied cost-benefit comarison reached 
its apotheosis with Judge Learned Hand's algebraic formula in U.S. 
v. Carroll Towing (1947) 159 F.2d 169: if the probability be called 
P, the injury L and the burden B, liability depends on whether 
B)PL. 
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Statutes also create duties whose breach may make the defendant 
criminally liable, liable under the law of torts, or both. 87 Statutory 
duties imposed under the Civil Aviation Act 1964 and the Civil Aviation 
Regulations 1953 are important, for example, in respect to liability 
for crop d~age arising from aerial application of pesticides. 88 The 
Occupiers' Liability Act 1962 lays down a common duty of care to all 
vi si tor s, and it is a duty to take such care as in all the 
circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be 
reasonably safe in using the premises for the purpose of which he is 
permitted by the occupier to be there. 89 As well. the Factories and 
Commercial Premises Act 1981 requires factory managers to ensure that 
every container holding material that is explosive , corrosive. 
irritant, radioactive, toxic, or otherwise hazardous, is safely and 
securely stored and clearly labelled. 90 Managers must also ensure that 
workers are instructed as to the dangers and precautions in connection 
with work, that there is sufficient knowledge and experience of that 
work and that there is adequate supervision; 91 and all practicable 
steps must be taken to protect workers from steam, fume, dust or other 
impuri ty that is likely to be injurious or offensive. 92 Specific 
duties apply with respect to explosive and flammable substances. 93 The 
Bush Workers Act 1945, the Construction Act 1959, and the Agricultural 
Workers Act 1977 establish general duties aimed at ensuring the safety 
and health of workers. 94 State enterprises are required to operate 
personnel policies which include provisions with respect to safe 
working conditions. 95 The Clean Air Act 1972 imposes a general duty 
upon the occupiers of all premises to adopt the best practicable means 
to minimise the emission of air pollutants, and to render any air 
pollutants harmless and inoffensive. 96 Further, the Crimes Act 1961 
87 Davis, supra note 78, at 165-173; see also Buckley, Liability in 
Tort for Breach of Statutory Duty, 100 L.Q.R. 204 (1984). 
88 See D.A.R. WILLIAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 222-233 
(1980). 
89 Occupiers' Liability Act 1962 s.4. 
90 Factories and Commercial Premises Act 1981 s. 22. 
91 Ibid. s. 20. 
92 Ibid. s. 36. 
93 Ibid. s. 31. 
94 Bush Workers Act 1945 s. 11A; Agricultural Workers Act 1977 s. 56; 
Construction Act 1959 s. 17. 
95 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 s. 4(2)(a). 
96 Clean Air Act 1972 s. 7(1). 
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also imposes duties upon persons doing dangerous acts and in charge of 
dangerous things. 97 
Also important is the leading case of Rylands v. Fletcher. 98 The 
principle enunciated by Blackburn J., that a "persQB who for his own 
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything 
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, 
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage 
which is the natural consequence of its escape,"99 created a new law by 
extending the incidence of strict liability to the general category of 
all inherently dangerous substances and making the occupier from whose 
land they escape responsible, even if he had used the utmost care and 
diligence in devising means for preventing their escape. 
The onus of strict liability and nuisance has in large measure been 
wi thdrawn from undertakings carried out under statutory authority. 
Legislative authorisation has been interpreted as not only legalising 
the enterprise itself and thereby removing the spectre of having it 
enjoined as a nuisance, but also of conferring immunity for any harmful 
97 Section 145 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides: 
"(1) Everyone commits criminal nuisance who does any unlawful act 
or omits to discharge any legal duty, such act or omission being 
one which he knew would endanger the lives, safety, or health of 
the public, or the life, safety, or health of any individual. 
"(2) Everyone who commits criminal nuisance is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year." 
Section 155 provides: 
"Everyone who undertakes (except in case of necessity) to 
administer surgical or medical treatment, or to do any other lawful 
act the doing of which is or may be dangerous to life, is under a 
legal duty to have and to use reasonable knowledge, skill, and care 
in doing any such act, and is criminally responsible for the 
consequences of omitting without lawful excuse to discharge that 
duty." 
Section 156 provides: 
"Everyone who has in his charge or under his control anything 
whatever, whether animate or inanimate, or maintains anything 
whatever. which in the absence of precaution or care, may endanger 
human life is under legal duty to take reasonable precautions 
against and to use reasonable care to avoid such danger, and is 
criminally responsible for the consequences of omitting without 
lawful excuse to discharge that duty. 
98 (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 265, affd. (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
99 L.R. 1 Ex. 265. 279-280. 
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consequences which occur, wi thout negligence, in its normal 
operation. 100 Whether an Act is merely permissive, or is one which 
expressly authorises the doing of a thing. whether it be a nuisance or 
not, is a question of construction: but generally when the thing to be 
done must necessarily cause injury to some one. the Act will be 
construed as authorising the doing of it: if the thing to be done will 
not necessarily cause injury, but will only do so if done in certain 
places or in a certain way, the Act will be construed as permissive 
only.l01 The statutory immunity is lost if the grantee fails in his 
duty of care to avoid all necessary harm. 
Such a defence against strict liability for aerial sprayers has been 
suggested in New Zealand. 102 The argument would be one where the 
aerial spraying was carried out by a pilot holding a chemical rating 
granted to him pursuant to the Civil Aviation Regulations 1953 and 
otherwise authorised by the Agricultural Chemicals Regulations 1968. 
Under the Accident Compensation Act 1982, a consolidation of earlier 
legislation, the tort system with respect to personal injury for 
accidents has been replaced. 103 The argument in favour of the Act was 
constructed upon by two fundamental principles: 104 
1. no satisfactory system of injury insurance can be organised 
except on a basis of community responsibility: 
2. wisdom, logic, and justice all require that every citizen who 
is injured must be included, and equal losses must be given 
equal treatment. There must be comprehensive entitlement. 
Both the legal doctrine, and the structure and operation of the system 
are well documented. 105 The main features of the scheme are that 
compensation is available to all accident victims, regardless of fault, 
100 Fleming, supra note 78, at 318-319, 407-408. 
101 Davis, supra note 78, at 18-19. 
102 Williams, supra note 88, at 232-233. 
103 For the his tory of thi s legi s la tion, see G. W. R. PALMER. 
COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY (1979). 
104 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION FOR 
PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW ZEALAND 20 (1967). 
105 Palmer, Compensation for Personal Injury: A Requiem for the Common 
Law in New Zealand, 21 AM. J. COMPo LAW 1 (1973); Woodhouse, 
Aspects of the Accident Compensation Scheme, [1979] NZLJ 395; A.P. 
BLAIR, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN NE'.J ZEALAND (2d ed. 1983); T .G. 
ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION (1980). 
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from the Accident Compensation Corporation, and tort liability for 
injuries covered by the scheme is abolished. 106 Revenue is derived 
from three sources and recorded in three separate funds: 
1. Levies on employers and the self-employed. 
2. Levies on motor vehicles. 
3. A supplementary fund created from general government revenues 
to provide benefits in respect of injuries not covered by 
either of the other two funds. 
Levies paid are set by the Governor-General by Order in Council, and 
may vary across different classes of industries and occupations. 107 As 
well, the Corporation may t after having regard to the accident 
experience of an employer or self-employed person, impose a penalty or 
provide a safety-incentive bonus. 
All cases of personal injury by accident are covered by the plan, 
including occupational diseases. Most other disabilities from disease 
or illness are excluded. 
The benefits (including medical care, earnings related compensation, 
and lump sums for permanent disability) depend on the nature and 
derivation of the injury, its financial significance, and the losses 
suffered by the claimant. In fatal cases the main benefits are 
earnings related compensation and lump sums for a dependent spouse and 
dependent children. 
Injuries sustained in industry, on military service, or as a result of 
crime are now included in the comprehensive plan rather than being 
covered by separate systems. 
An extensive literature has developed subsequent to the implementation 
of the Accident Compensation Act. Authors have examined the 
jurisdiction of the ACC in light of the abolition of civil actions for 
106 The removal of tort liability has had its critics, see for example, 
The \voodhouse Report: A Panel Discussion [1969] NZLJ 297; Marks, A 
First in No-Fault Liability, 47 AUST. L.J. 516 (1973); Clayton, The 
Accident Compensation Act - A Protest and a Prediction, [1974] NZLJ 
185. 
107 Accident Compensation Act s 39. 
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personal injury, 108 the reform of New Zealand law for compensating 
incapacitated people, 109 and more latterly the comparison of the New 
Zealand scheme to other liability systems. 110 The scheme has also come 
in for recent review. III 
t# 
108 Vennel, Some Kiwi Kite-Flying, [1975] NZLJ 255; Willy, The Accident 
Compensation Act and Recovery for Losses Arising From Personal 
Injury and Death by Accident, 6 NZULR 250 (1975); Cochrane, How Far 
Does the Jurisdiction of the ACC Extend, [1977] NZLJ 74. 
109 G.W.R. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY (1979); Gaskins, Tort 
Reform in the Welfare State: The New Zealand Accident CompensatiOn 
Act, 18 OS. HALL L.J. 238 (1980); Palmer, What Happened to the 
Woodhouse Report?, [1981] NZLJ 561; Rea. Accident Compensation: A 
Cuckoo in the Sparrow's Nest of Social Welfare, 4 AULR 235 (1982). 
110 Palmer, Accident Comensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 
25 AM. J. COMPo LAW 1 (1977); Holyoak, Accident Compensation in New 
Zealand Today, 180 In: ALLEN, BROWN, HOLYOAK, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 
AFTER PEARSON (1979); Rea, Economic Analysis of Fault and No-Fault 
Liability Systems, 12 CAN. BUS. L.J. 44 (1986); Fleming, Is There a 
Future for Tort?, 58 AUST. L.J. (1984). 
III LAW COMMISSION, THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SCHEME: INTERIM REPORT ON 
ASPECTS OF FUNDING (1987). 
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Appendix three: Restricting the cost of hazards realised 
The costs of hazards realised are restricted by the existing law in 
three ways: 
1. Providing for the collection of information on the use and 
whereabouts of hazardous substances; 
2. Providing for emergency services; and by, 
3. Providing for the review of existing institutional 
arrangements. 
Some of the detail of these mechanisms is reviewed in turn. 
Information 
The costs of hazards realised are restricted by knowing what substances 
are used where. Records of the sale of explosives,112 irradiating 
apparatus,113 and deadly and dangerous poisonsl14 must be kept. The 
Director-General of Health must maintain a register of those licensed 
to use and administer radioactive materials, 115 and District Medical 
Officers of Health must maintain registers of those licensed to sell 
and pack poisons. 116 The Pesticide Board must maintain registers of 
pesticides used in New Zealand117 and of licensed pesticide 
operators. lIB Licensing arrangements for explosives enable authorities 
to know of their importation, manufacture, sale, storage, and 
transportation. 119 Licensing requirements similarly enable local 
authorities to know where and how dangerous goods are stored within 
their districts. 120 Town and country planning consent procedures also 
enable local authorities to know where and how hazardous substances are 
stored, transported, and disposed of.121 
112 Explosives Act 1957 s. 24. 
113 Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 14(2). 
114 Toxic Substances Act 1979 s. 27. 
115 Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 19. 
116 Toxic Substances Act 1979 s. 40. 
117 Pesticides Act 1979 s. 33. 
lIB Ibid. s. 51. 
119 Explosives Act 1957 sSG 11,16,23,40. 
120 Dangerous Goods Act 1974 s. 9. 
121 Town and Country Planning Act 1977 SSe 36(1,4),67,69, Second 
Schedule. 
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Infectious diseases specified in the schedule to the Health Act 1956 
are monitored by the Department of Health. 122 
Also provided for is the collection of information on accidents. 
Details of accidents with explosives and dangerous goods must be given 
to the Chief Inspector of Explosives. 123 The proper authorities must 
be notified of any containers leaking toxic substances on arrival in 
New Zealand,124 and the Medical Officer of Health must be informed of 
cases of poisoning admitted to hospitals under the control of a 
Hospi tal Board .125 A re gister of a11 accidents in factories and 
forests must be kept,126 as must all claims made under the Accident 
Compensation Act 1982. 127 Several Acts dealing with specific 
activities or functions have provisions under which serious accidents 
must be notified to an Inspector, or other responsible person acting 
under the authority of the Act concerned, with the Minister responsible 
for the administration of that Act able to direct a formal 
investigation into the cause of the accident. 128 For some activities 
the initiation of a formal inquiry subsequent to notification of the 
accident remains the responsibility of the Inspector. 129 Provision for 
notification of serious accidents or incidents, and the initiation of 
formal inquiries, is also built into the major transport 
legislation. 130 
Emergency services 
Emergency services are provided for under the Fire Service Act 1975 and 
the Civil Defence Act 1983. 
122 Health Act 1956 sSG 70-87A. 
123 Explosives Act 1957 s. 51; Dangerous Goods Act 1974 SSe 33,34. 
124 Toxic Substances Act 1979 s. 44. 
125 Ibid. s. 76. 
126 Factories and commercial Premises Act 1981 s. 53; Bush Workers Act 
1945 s. 8. 
127 Accident Compensation Act 1982 s. 93(1),94(1-2). 
128 Mining Act 1971 sSG 206,210; Coal Mines Act 1979 SSe 177,181; 
Construction Act 1959 SSe 19,20; Quarries and Tunnels Act 1982 SSe 
71,75. 
129 Petroleum Act 1937 s. 47B; Factories and Commercial Premises Act 
1981 sSG 54(2,4); Bush Workers Act 1945 s. 14. 
130 Transport Act 1962 sSG 81,82; Civil Aviation Act 1964 s. 19; 
Shipping and Seamen Act 1952 sSG 324,325. 
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Facility for review 
The law provides considerable scope for its own review in the light of 
experience. The five main statutes dealing directly with hazardous 
substances, for example, enable licenses and consents to be revoked131 
and contain provision for revising regulation. 132 Other statutes also 
provide for review. The Fire Service Commission, for example, may make 
recommendations as to alterations of statutory responsibilities and 
function in respect of fire safety and in respect of the packing, 
marking, handling, carriage, storage and use of hazardous materials. 133 
The Ministry for the Environment has, among another things, to provide 
the Government, its agencies, and other public authorities, with advice 
both on the application, operation and effectiveness of a number of 
statutes, and on the control of hazardous substances. 134 
131 Explosives Act 1957 SSe 53,54; Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 20; 
Dangerous Goods Act 1974 s. 13; Toxic Substances Act 1979 s. 64; 
Pesticides Act 1979 SSe 28,29,52. 
132 Explosives Act 1957 s. 62; Radiation Protection Act 1965 s. 31; 
Dangerous Goods Act 1974 s. 35; Toxic Substances Act 1979 s. 82; 
Pesticides Act 1979 SSe 53,76. 
133 Fire Service Act 1975 SSe 21(3),21(4)(c). 
134 Environment Act 1986 SSe 31(c)(i,v). 
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Appendix four: Liability rules and economic theory 
Applying economic theory to deduce the consequences of different legal 
rules is a well developed field of inquiry.135 The literature applying 
to accident law alone is considerable, and what follows below is but a 
brief (and uncritical) review. 136 In this literature: 
A specification of how the cost of an accident is to be shared 
among the parties to the accident ••• is called a liability rule. 
Rules that allow a party to escape liability completely by spending 
a sufficient amount of resources on accident avoidance are called 
negligence rules; the specified accident avoidance level is called 
the legal standard of negligence or the standard of care, and a 
person who fails to meet this standard is termed negligent. The 
consequences of alternative liability rules are explored under the 
premise that the potential parties to an accident know the 
liability rule and that each person chooses an accident avoidance 
expenditure to maximise his own welfare given similar behaviour on 
the part of others. The goal is to identify liability rules that 
entail proper accident avoidance expenditures, that is, those that 
minimise the sum of the costs of avoiding accidents and the 
expected costs of the accidents themselves. 137 
135 The intellectual history of applying economic theory to the law was 
reviewed by Posner, The· Economic Approach to the Law, 53 TEX. L. 
REV. 757 (1975). 
136 For critical reviews, see Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some 
Realism about Nominalism, 60 VIR. L. REV. 451 (1974); Buchanan, 
Good Economics: Bad Law, 60 VIR. L. REV. 483; Polinsky, Economic 
Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to 
Posner's "Economic Analysis of Law", 87 HARV. L REV. 1655; Baker, 
The Ideology of Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. 7 PUB. AFFAIRS 3 
(1975); Veljanovski, The Economic Approach to the Law: A Critical 
Introduction, 7 BRIT. J. LAW & SOC. 158 (1980); Burrows, Nuisance, 
Legal Rules and Decentralised Decisions: A Different View of the 
Cathedral Crypt, pp.151-166. In: P. BURROWS & C.G. VELJANOVSKI, THE 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW (1981); Englard, The System Builders: A 
Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 
27 (1980); Ogus, Social Costs in a Private Law Setting, 3 INT'L 
REV. LAW & ECON. 27 (1983); Guest, Uti1atarianism, Economics, and 
the Common Law,S OTAGO L. REV. 656 (1984). 
137 Graham & Peirce, Contingent Damages for Products Liability, 1984 J. 
LEGAL. STUD. 441, 442-443. An alternative view is that of tort law 
based upon the concept of corrective justice: that is, upon the 
notion that when a man harms another the victim has the moral right 
to demand, and the injurer a moral duty to pay him, compensation 
for the harm; see Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. 
STUD. 151 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a 
System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, 
Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 391 (1975); Epstein, Nuisance 
Law and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 49 (1979); see 
also, Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 419 
(1979); Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, J. LEG. STUD. 
457 (1979); Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to 
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Deterrence and cost internalisation 
Deterrence is concerned with trying to prevent individuals from 
committing torts; cost internalisation with trying to make individuals, 
through the marketplace, pay for the cost they .impose on others e 138 
Sir John Salmond recognised that the low 
of preventing men from hurting one 
internalisation has a deterrent effect. 
of tort exists for the purpose 
another,139 Le. that cost 
In the 1960s, Guido Calabresi 
(Yale University Law School) employed price theory to conclude that 
accident costs are minimised by placing liability upon the party or 
combination of parties that can avoid accident costs most cheaply.140 
In such analysis, damages paid over to the plaintiff are viewed as the 
price of enlisting their participation in the operation of a social 
mechanism designed to bring about, at least approximately, a cost-
justified level of accidents and safety.141 
Liability insurance does not necessarily compromise the deterrent 
effect of tort law. Although the tortfeasor will not personally have 
to pay any damages awarded against him, his insurer will have to do so; 
and the insurer may in return increase the insured's premiums. 142 It 
has even been suggested that tort law backed by liability insurance may 
be a greater incentive to safety than tort law alone. 143 This is 
because the threat of having to pay substantial damages may be quite 
two Critics, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 477 (1979). 
138 Atiyah, American Tort Law in Crisis, 7 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 279,279 
(1987) • 
139 Heuston, supra note 77, at 13. 
140 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961), and Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: 
An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 
(1965); see also Calabresi, Right Approach. Wrong Implications: A 
Critique of HcKean on Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 74 
(1970); for a formal presentation and some extension to Calabresi's 
work. see Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 107 
(1974). An application of the Calabresian strategy is to establish 
a rule that all firms handling hazardous waste, from the generator 
to the final disposer, are jointly and severally liable for its 
ultimate disposal costs, see Anon., Allocating the Costs of 
Hazardous Wastes Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 584, 588 (1980); for an 
application to products liability, see Stapleton, Products 
Liability Reform: Real or Illusory, 6 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 392 
(1986) • 
141 Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29,33 (1972). 
142 Atiyah, Accident Prevention and Variable Premium Rates for Work-
Connected Accidents - I. 4 INDUST. L. J. 1,1 (1975) 
143 Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law , 53 VIR. L. 
REV. 815,825 (1967). 
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meaningless to a tort feasor who has not got the assets to meet them; 
the "threat of increased premiums, by contrast, may be more real because 
they will, indeed, have to be paid. An analysis of insurance for work 
related accidents has favoured premiums assessed upon a combination of 
classified rating (i.e. variation which takes in the risk of different 
industries) and experience rating (Le. variation according to the 
accident record of particular employers).144 
The attractiveness of tort law as a mechanism of providing both 
deterrence and compensation diminishes, however, as the number of 
injured parties increases, as the source of these injuries becomes more 
difficult to isolate and identify, and the manifestation of injury is 
delayed in time. 145 Alternative private and government mechanisms for 
the provision of both compensation and deterrence have been suggested 
in response to the increasing number of actions of this type. 146 
The economic implications of changing product liability rules has also 
been analysed, but no general conclusions reached to guide the choice 
between caveat emptor and caveat vendor, and the possible intermediate 
liability ru1es. 147 It has been conjectured, however, that placing the 
liability of accidents upon the general taxpayer, rather than upon the 
producer or consumer, would increase production of hazardous products 
and would require extensive government regulations, safety standards 
144 Atiyah, Accident Prevention and Variable Premium Rates for Work-
Connected Accidents - I, 4 INDUST. L. J. 1 (1975), and Atiyah, 
Accident Prevention and Variable Premium Rates for Work-Connected 
Accidents - II, 4 INDUST. L. J. 89 (1975); see also Phillips, 
Economic Deterrence and the Prevention of Industrial Accidents, 5 
INDUST. L. J. 148 (1976). 
145 Danzon & Epstein, Introduction, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 415 (1984). 
146 See, for example, Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass 
Tort Litigation, l3 J. LEG. STUD. 475 (1984); see also Boden, 
Comment on Epstein, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 507 (1984). 
147 See, for example. McKean, infra note 148, Buchanan, In Defense of 
Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 64 (1970), and Dorfman, The 
Economics of Products Liability. 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 92 (1970); 
Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability 
Scholarship, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 763 (1985); Ca1abresi & K1evorick, 
Four Tests of Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 585 (1985); 
Land es & Posner, A Posi ti ve Economic Analysis of Products 
Liability, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 535 (1985). 
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and product warnings to counter the prob1em. 148 Indeed, that the 
Accident Compensation Act introduced in New Zealand in 1972 had 
dispersed the cost of defective products was an argument employed in 
support of consumer protection law, an argument which culminated in~the 
" Fair Trading Act 1986. 149 
One method of determining damages to be paid is to estimate personal 
injury loss. 150 A more sophisticated method is a two part rule of 
damages: (1) a compensatory award, paid to the victim, determined by 
the amount of insurance he would chosen to buy given the price of the 
defendant's liability insurance; (2) a 'deterrence surcharge' or fine 
on the defendant, paid to the state, determined by potential victims' 
willingness to pay for injury prevention and by the uninsured cost of 
suit to the defendant. 151 
Regulation v. liability 
Liability in tort and the regulation of safety represent two very 
different methods for controlling the use of hazardous substances. 
Tort liability is private in nature and operates indirectly through the 
deterrent effect of actions for damages that may be brought once harm 
occurs. Standards, prohibitions, and other forms of safety regulation, 
in contrast, are public in character and modify behaviour directly 
through requirements imposed independent of the actual occurrence of 
harm. 
Steven Shave11 (Harvard Law School) analysed four determinants of the 
relative desirability of liability and regu1ation: 152 
148 McKean, Products Liability: Implications of Some Changing Property 
Rights, 84 QUART. J. ECON. 611, and McKean, Products Liability: 
Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 52-53 (1970). 
149 Palmer, Dangerous Products and the Consumer in New Zealand, [1975] 
NZLJ 366. 
150 Komesar, Toward a General Theory of Personal Injury Loss, 3 J. LEG. 
STUD. 457 (1974). 
151 Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer 
Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977); Danzon, Tort Reform and 
the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEG. 
STUD. 517 (1984); Rubenfeld, On Determining the Optimal Magnitude 
and Length of Liability in Torts, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 551 (1984). 
152 Shavel1, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEG. 
STUD. 357 (1984). 
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1. Difference in knowledge of hazardous activities. t{here private 
parties have superior knowledge of the benefits of activities, the 
costs of reducing the hazard, or the probability or severity of 
~accident, it would be better for them to decide about the control 
of risks, indicating an advantage of liability rules, all things 
being equal. 
2. Private parties might be incapable of paying for the full magnitude 
of the harm done. Where this is the case, liability would not 
furnish adequate incentives to control risk, because private 
parties would treat losses caused that exceed their assets as 
imposing liabilities only equal to their assets. But under 
regulation inability to pay for harm done would be irrelevant, 
assuming that parties would be made to take steps to reduce risk as 
a precondition for engaging in their activities. 153 
3. Possibility that parties would not face the threat of suit for harm 
done. Like inability to pay for harm, such a possibility results 
in a dilution of the incentives to reduce risk created by 
liability, but is of no import under regulation. Reasons why a 
defendant might escape tort liability are that the harms he 
generates are widely dispersed, a long period of time passes before 
the harm manifests itself. or that it is difficult to attribute 
harm to the parties who are in fact responsible for producing it. 
4. Magnitude of the administrative costs incurred by private parties 
and by the public in using the tort system or direct regulation. A 
consideration of costs favours liability for most of its 
administrative costs are incurred only if harm occurs. 154 
153 The problem of insolvency has, however often been overstated, see 
Landes & Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic 
Injuries, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 417 (1984); Oi, Tort Law as a Regulatory 
Regime: A Comment on Landes and Posner, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 435 (1984). 
154 See also Wheeler, The Use of Criminal Statutes to Regulate Product 
Safety, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 593 (1984); Cook, The Use of Criminal 
Statutes to Regulate Product Safety: Comment on Wheeler, 13 J. LEG. 
STUD. 619 (1984); Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for 
Benefit? 13 J. LEG. STUD. 57; Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post 
Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. 
LEG. STUD. 193 (1977). 
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Shavell concludes that a complete solution to the control of hazards 
should involve the joint use of liability and regulation, with the 
balance between them reflecting the importance of the determinants. 155 
An opposing view is that of Peter Huber (Massachusets Institute of 
Technology).156 He argued that the judicature is too conservative in 
its decisions, and that decisions on the control of public risks should 
be made by expert administrative agencies as experts are best able to 
assess the benefits of accepting greater public risks. 
Strict liability Vo negligence 
Calabresi reasoned that the prices of goods should reflect their full 
cost to society to achieve a cost-justified level of accidents and 
safety.157 This in turn requires that the cost of injuries be borne by 
the activities which caused them, whether or not fault is involved, 
because, either way, the injury is a real cost of those activities. 158 
He thus favoured strict liability. 
But as pointed out by Richard Posner (University of Chicago), the case 
against a negligence standard of liability is not clear cut; if 
negligence is assessed upon an economic criterion (i.e. by whether the 
product of the probability of the accident and the gravity of the 
accident exceeds the burdens of taking precautions, with marginal, not 
155 For the problems of regulation, see Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MAN. SCI. 3 (1971); Peltzman, Toward 
a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976). 
156 Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk 
Management in the Courts, 85 COL. L REV. 277 (1985). 
157 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961); Calabresi, The Decision for 
Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Cost, 78 HARV. L. 
REV. 713, 719-720 (1965). 
158 Certainly strict liability for hazardous activities cannot be 
justified on the grounds that those engaged in such activities are 
the superior risk-bearers, they need not be, see Morris, Hazardous 
Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952). 
Note too that liability should not be confined to those hazards 
which are foreseeable, see Morris, Enterprise Liability and the 
Actuarial Process - The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 
554 (1961); but see Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate 
Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk 
Relationship, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 689 (1985); Cooter, Defective 
Warnings, Remote Causes, and Bankruptcy: Comment on Schwartz, 14 J. 
LEG. STUD. 737 (1985). 
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total, costs and benefits compared 159), a negligence standard is 
broadly consistent with an optimal investment in accident prevention by 
the enterprises subject to the standard .160 Moreover, a negligence 
rule has the advantage that it encourages all parties to consider how 
they might reduce the hazard and thus is more likely to achieve a 
desirable result,161 and it avoids the crushing liability which can 
result if injurers are made to pay for most or all accidents in which 
they are involved and which would have occurred in their absence. 162 
However, for acti vi ties which are ultrahazardous, i. e. where 
unavoidable accident costs are great (e.g. blasting), Posner favoured 
strict liability as a means of compelling those responsible to take 
into account the cost of unavoidable accidents and to consider less 
hazardous means of achieving the same result (e.g. digging instead of 
blasting) .163 Under a negligence rule, however, the courts must 
grapple with elusive concepts in order to judge what is negligent,164 
and once conduct is described as reasonable no legal sanction attaches 
to it. 165 
159 Brown, Toward and Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 
323, 332-334 (1973); for the method of estimating the value of 
marginal improvements in safety and the marginal cost of providing 
such improvements, see Graham & Peirce, Contingent Damages for 
Products Liability, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 441 (1984); Rea, Contingent 
Damages, Negligence, and Absolute Liability: A Comment on Graham 
and Peirce, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 469 (1984). 
160 Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, at 32-33,74-76 
(1972); see also, Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. 
LEG. STUD. 1 (1980). Note that key factors in the economic 
analysis of liability rules are not cause but the probability of 
the accident and the costs of legal administration, see Calabresi & 
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE 
L.J. 1055 (1972); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: 
An Essay for Harry Kalven. Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); 
Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. 
LEG. STUD. 109 (1983). 
161 Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973). 
162 Schmalz, On the Financing of Compensation Schemes, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 
807 (1985); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of 
Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 463 (1980); but see 
also Burrows, Tort and Tautology: The Logic of Restricting the 
Scope of Liability, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 399 (1984). 
163 Posner, supra note 160, at 76. 
164 Rizzo, Law Amid Fl ux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict 
Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 291 (1980); Rubin, 
Predictability and the Economic Approach to the Law: A Comment on 
Rizzo, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 319 (1980). 
165 Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151,157 
(1973) • 
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Whether strict liability means more court cases than a negligence rule 
is not clear .166 On the one hand, dispensing with the negligence 
requirement enhances an injured party's incentive to sue and could lead 
to more court decisions; but, on the other hand, with negligence no 
longer an issue, the proportion of claims settled out of court could 
increase. The actual result will depend upon which effect is the 
strongest. 
166 Ver Steeg, Strict Liability and Judicial Resources, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 
217 (1974). 
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Appendix Five: Specification of hazardous substances 
Environment Act 1986 
"Hazardous substance" means dangerous goods as defined by the Dangerous 
Goods Act 1974, toxic substances as defined by Toxic Substances Act 
1979, and any other inflammable, toxic, explosive, infectious, 
radioactive, or other substance which may impair human, plant, or 
animal health. 
Explosives Act 1957 
"Explosive" means any substance or mixture or combination of substances 
which in its normal state is capable either of decomposition at such 
a rapid rate as to result in an explosion or of producing a 
pyrotechnic effect; and, without limiting the foregoing provisions 
of this definition, includes -
(a) Gunpowder, nitroglycerine, dynamite, guncotton, blasting 
powder, fulminate of mercury or of other metals, coloured fires, fog 
signals, fireworks, fuses, rockets, percussion caps, detonators, 
cartridges, and ammunition of all descriptions; 
(b) Any device, contrivance, or article which utilises an 
explosive as an integral part of it for the purposes of producing an 
explosive, ballistic, or pyrotechnic effect; 
(c) Any preparation or adaptation of an explosive as hereinbefore 
defined; -
but does not include an explosive substance or explosive mixture or 
combination of substances that has been effectively rendered inert 
by a sui table form of treatment, whether by way of solution, 
dilution, admixture with other materials, or any other effective 
method, nor an explosive substance or mixture or combination of 
substances that has been declared not to be an explosive by the 
Minister by notice published in the Gazette. 
Radiation Protection Act 1965 
"Radioactive material" means any article containing a radioactive 
substance giving it a specific radioacti vi ty exceeding 100 
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kilobecquerels per kilogram and total radioactivity exceeding 3 
kilobecquerels. 
Dangerous Goods Act 1914 
"Dangerous goods" means goods of any of the kinds specified in the 
Schedule to this Act; and a reference in this Act to a specified class 
or to a specified subclass of dangerous goods shall mean a reference to 
all the dangerous goods in that class or, as the case may be. in that 
subclass, as set out in the Schedule to this Act: 
SCHEDULE 
Section 2 "Dangerous Goods" 
NOTE: The classes of dangerous goods in this Schedule follow the 
recommendations of the United Nations Committee of Experts on the 
Transport of Dangerous Goods. 
Class 2 
Gases, being -
(a) Gases (other than those included under any other paragraph of this 
Class) when compressed, liquefied, or dissolved under pressure. 
(b) Ethane, ethylene, hydrogen, methane, and any other flammable gas 
(other than that included under any succeeding paragraph of this 
class) • 
(c) Acetylene, compressed or dissolved, and contained within a porous 
substance. 
(d) Liquefied petroleum gas, and any other liquefied flammable gas. 
(e) Chlorine. 
(f) Anhydrous ammonia. 
(g) Liquid ammonia. 
Class 3 
Flammable liquids, mixtures of liquids, liquids containing solids in 
solution or suspension, and nitrocellulose, being -
(a) Liquids, mixtures of liquids, and liquids containing solids in 
solution or suspension, which in each case has a flash point 
lower than 23 degrees Celsius, and nitrocellulose having a 
nitrogen content of not more than 12.6 percent by weight and 
wetted, gelatinised, or blended with an industrial solvent or 
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"" other material approved as to kind and quantity by the Chief 
Inspector. 
(b) Liquids, mixtures of liquids, and liquids containing solids in 
solution or suspension, which in each case has a flash point 
of 61 degrees Celsius or lower, but not lower than 23 degrees 
Celsius. 
(c) Fuel oil. 
Flammable solids, being -
(a) Calcium carbide. 
Class 4 
(b) Phosphorous (white or yellow). 
Class 5 
Oxidising substances, being -
(a) Chromates and dichromates, chlorates, inorganic peroxides, 
nitrates, perchlorates, permanganates, and hydrogen peroxide 
solutions containing more than 8 percent hydrogen peroxide. 
(b) Organic peroxides. 
Class 8 
Corrosives, being hydrochloric acid, hydrofluoric acid. nitric acid, 
sulphuric acid, potassium hydroxide in solution, sodium hydroxide in 
solution, and aqueous ammonia. 
Toxic Substances Act 1979 
"Toxic substance" includes -
(a) Any poison or harmful substance: 
(b) Any acaricide, insecticide, fungicide, larvicide, nematocide, 
pesticide, or herbicide: 
(c) Any tobacco prepared for smoking, chewing, or snuffing: 
(d) Any other substance (not being -
(i) A food within the meaning of the Food and Drug Act 
1969; or 
(ii) Except in Part V of this Act, a restricted drug within 
the meaning of the Restricted Drugs Act 1960, or a 
radioactive material \vithin the meaning of the 
Radiation Protection Act 1965, or a controlled drug 
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wi thin the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1975) -
that, when swallowed, inhaled, or injected into or otherwise 
absorbed by the human body, is likely, by reason of its toxic 
properties, to destroy life or to be injurious to health: 
(e) Any other substance that, by reason of its chemical or 
biochemical properties, may directly or indirectly adversely affect 
the environment. 
Pesticides Act 1979 
"Pesticide" means any substance or mixture of substances represented by 
the proprietor as suitable for the eradication or control of any 
pest, whether by way of modification of behaviour or development or 
otherwise; and includes any substance or mixture of substances 
represented by the proprietor as suitable for use as a plant growth 
regulator, or a defoliant, or a desiccant; and also includes any 
substance or organism from time to time declared under section 7 of 
this Act; but does not include a fertiliser, or an animal remedy 
within the meaning of the Animal Remedies Act 1967. 
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